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ABSTRACT
This contribution increases the understanding of the EU’s role in
post-conﬂict settings by exploring perceptions of EULEX by local
rule of law experts. Drawing on critical peacebuilding and the
decline of normative power Europe literatures, we develop an
analytical framework, underlining the importance of the intention–
implementation gap and the implementation–perception gap in
understanding how EU missions are perceived. By comparing local
expert narratives to those of EULEX judges, prosecutors, and legal
oﬃcers, we contend that the core problem for the negative
perception of the mission results from what we call the double
proximity paradox in peacebuilding. The ﬁrst paradox is one of
implementation and transpires when an actor commits substantial
resources to address structural problems in a post-conﬂict territory
due to its centrality for its own interests, but fails to uphold its
commitment as its immediate interests can only be achieved
through agents who contribute to these problems. The second
paradox relates to perception and transpires as high
commitments raise expectations of structural impact. The visibility
of the actor’s investment makes any implementation failures more
tangible. The actor is therefore, paradoxically, the most open to
criticism in a territory where it is doing the most.
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1. Introduction
The European Union (EU, Union) and Kosovo had enjoyed an awkward relationship even
before the latter declared independence in 2008. Although ﬁve EU member states still do
not recognise its sovereignty, Kosovo is considered a potential candidate for membership
in the Union (EU 2003). Opinion polls in Kosovo reveal 80–90 per cent support for member-
ship (Regional Cooperation Council 2019), but Kosovo citizens are the only ones among the
potential Western Balkans candidates requiring visas to travel to the EU. The main obstacle in
visa liberalisation and the overall progress in the Stabilisation and Association Process have
been high levels of organised crime and corruption (Emini and Nechev 2018). In February
2008, as a sign of its commitment to improving Kosovo’s rule of law, the Council of the EU
established the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) (EU 2008).
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EULEX has its current mandate until 14 June 2020, now focusing on mentoring and
advising local institutions. But until June 2018, EULEX was not just the largest and most
expensive Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission, it was also the only
mission where the EU had an executive mandate. EU judges, prosecutors, investigators,
and customs oﬃcials were asked to dispense justice in the most sensitive areas of law:
organised crime and corruption, war crimes, terrorism, and inter-ethnic crimes. Unsurpris-
ingly, the mission has been viewed as a test of EU’s peacebuilding capability (Keukeleire
and Thiers 2010, p. 354, Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012, p. 747). Most research has
focused on successes and failures of EULEX from the perspective of the EU (Keukeleire
and Thiers 2010, Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012, Grevi 2009, Greiçevci 2011, Kammel
2011, Radin 2014, Zupančič and Pejič 2018), with some peacebuilding studies taking a
more bottom-up approach (Visoka 2011, Mahr 2018, Zupančič 2018). These latter
studies looked at popular resistance by Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs, and critiques
voiced by two prominent political actors: the Movement for Self-Determination and the
veterans of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Both the top-down and bottom-up works are
highly critical of the mission.
With this article, we aim to increase the understanding of the EU’s ability to act in post-
conﬂict settings by exploring perceptions of EULEX by local rule of law experts. Our
research focused on the judicial side, as this was not only the most visible, but also the
most criticised component.1 We interviewed local judges and civil society actors, all
with deep familiarity with the rule of law in Kosovo and the EU assistance to the sector.
Unlike the bottom-up studies above, our focus was on generally constructive agents.
Paﬀenholz (2015, p. 858) argues that the almost exclusive focus on everyday resistance
in current critical peacebuilding scholarship is oﬀering a reductive view of the local, con-
structing it as a binary opposite of the international. We contribute to peacebuilding litera-
ture, by focusing on the local level living in a symbiotic relationship with the international.
These individuals are also the group through which international actors try to secure local
ownership (von Billerbeck 2015, Ejdus 2017), making them consequential for how the EU
judges its own success. Their critiques add a bottom-up or “Kosovo” dimension to debates
on the “capability–expectations gap” of the EU (Hill 1993), which emphasise the mismatch
between EU plans and their execution from the perspective of Brussels and member
states.
For the empirical study, we develop an analytical framework, underlining the impor-
tance of the intention–implementation gap and the implementation–perception gap in
how international missions are perceived. We systematically compare local expert narra-
tives to those of implementers of the executive mandate – EULEX judges, prosecutors,
and legal oﬃcers –, trying to understand whether local critiques pertain to the idea or
the implementation of the mission. Our data draws on 25 in-depth interviews conducted
in Priština and Mitrovica in October 2017.2 Our judges were Kosovo-Albanian, as the inte-
gration of the Kosovo-Serb judiciary had not occurred yet, while civil society actors came
from both majority and minority group and represented NGOs, research institutes, and
media. Interviewees were selected according to a snow-ball selection procedure. With
local interviews, we prioritised interlocutors with a representative view from diﬀerent
ethnic parts of the society, based on a context- and gender- sensitive understanding of
the local dynamics; with international interviewees, we sought diﬀerent levels and types
of experience with EULEX.
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We identify several salient critiques of EULEX by local experts and conclude that the
core problem for the negative perception of the mission results from what we call the
double proximity paradox in peacebuilding. The ﬁrst paradox relates to mission implemen-
tation (the intention–implementation gap). It transpires when an actor is willing to dedi-
cate substantial resources (heavy-footprint mission, ﬁnancial commitment, high-level
attention) to address structural problems in a post-conﬂict territory due to its centrality
for its own interests. However, in such a territory the intervening actor will have other pri-
orities, implementation of which often relies on actors responsible for the same structural
problems the outside actor is trying to address. Maintaining normative commitments is
therefore, paradoxically, the most diﬃcult in an area where the actor’s willingness to
support these is the greatest. The actor might invest in normative commitments but com-
promises their implementation due to more immediate concerns. The second paradox
relates to how this implementation is perceived (implementation–perception gap). It tran-
spires as the actor commits substantial resources to addressing structural problems,
making their implementation more visible. The visibility of this investment and the result-
ing high expectations make any implementation failures more tangible. The actor is there-
fore, paradoxically, the most open to criticism in a territory where it is doing the most. As a
result, when normative commitments are compromised, due to the ﬁrst paradox, the actor
can be perceived as having achieved even less than what it has.
Our argument is developed through three sections. The ﬁrst section provides the theor-
etical backbone for the paper, bringing together literatures on critical peacebuilding and
studies on the decline of normative power Europe. Building on these ﬁndings, we develop
our analytical framework. The second section is a short background on EULEX and the
broader EU presence in Kosovo. The third section analyses our empirical material compar-
ing perceptions of EULEX implementation by its staﬀ and local experts. We conclude with
some broader observations on the EU’s ability to act in post-conﬂict settings.
2. Liberal peacebuilding and its reception by local actors
2.1. Liberal peacebuilding, its critiques, and policy adaptations
Research on why local actors oppose international peacebuilding achieved a newmomen-
tum in the early 2000s as a direct result of limited achievements of several ambitious post-
conﬂict reconstruction programmes, the so-called liberal peacebuilding (Paﬀenholz 2015).
A major component of liberal peacebuilding is “directed at constructing or reconstructing
institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economical
safety” (Chesterman 2005, p. 5). Rule of law is a prominent aspect, mostly involving aid
to rebuild infrastructure and capacity-building programmes, such as training of local
police and judiciary (Tolbert and Solomon 2006, Osland 2019). In some settings, including
in Kosovo, these policies were implemented through executive missions.
Liberal peacebuilding is critiqued for being a coercive strategy (Heathershaw 2008,
p. 597) that “reﬂects the practical and ideological interests of the global north” (Mac
Ginty 2010, p. 393). As a form, it lacks accountability and local participation in the
decision-making; substantively, it pursues the same liberal policies for diﬀerent contexts,
thus not responding to the needs of the local population. While both impact the percep-
tion of peacebuilding operations, form is primarily linked to input legitimacy, while
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substance to output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). However, form and substance are inter-
linked (Mügge 2011), with liberal rational-legal frameworks inﬂuencing the design of
peacebuilding missions, and these, in turn, implementing the same liberal rationalities.
A core critique of peacebuilding has been its operationalisation as a one-size-ﬁts-all
approach, “peace from IKEA; a ﬂat-pack peace made from standardized components”
(Mac Ginty 2008, p. 145). International peacebuilding eﬀorts are implemented through
bureaucratic, technical solutions, where thematic expertise is prioritised over local/
country knowledge (Autesserre 2014, pp. 68–69). Such an approach leads to instrumental-
ist understanding of local dynamics and formulaic relations with people living in areas of
intervention. This, in turn, impacts the substance of peacebuilding policies and “/a/lthough
peacebuilding is committed to positive peace, its discourses and practices tend to depo-
liticise peace” (Goetschel and Hagmann 2009, p. 66). When it comes to rule of law, this
liberal agenda has mimicked Western standards of justice, promoting accountability, pro-
tection of individual rights, equality before law, independent judiciary, and a fair and trans-
parent process (Krastev and Holmes 2018).
To respond to these failures, international actors embraced the idea of local ownership
(von Billerbeck 2015, Ejdus 2017). Local ownership is intended to create stronger consul-
tation mechanisms with beneﬁciaries of international eﬀorts, thus creating more conﬂict-
sensitive policies and a better buy-in. By changing the form of international peacebuilding,
that is, its input legitimacy, the substance is assumed to become more legitimate and sus-
tainable. In practice, local ownership is implemented through civil society and local
experts (von Billerbeck 2015, Ejdus 2017). Such an approach has been promoted by
earlier peacebuilding scholars, who see this level of society having the biggest peacebuild-
ing potential (Lederach 1997). Our study therefore explores critiques by actors who are
deemed the natural partners for peacebuilding missions.
While there is a plethora of studies advising institutions how to better implement local
ownership (Donais 2009, Zürcher and Barnett 2009), most bottom-up analyses have taken
a critical approach (Lemay-Hébert and Kappler 2016). Scholars have argued that local own-
ership “is neither ‘local’ nor ownership” (Richmond 2012, p. 371), pointing to a fundamen-
tal gap between the discourse and practice, as international actors often perceive the
devolution of agency to local actors as endangering the achievement of their overall
goals (von Billerbeck 2015). Others maintained that these locals are co-opted into the
liberal peacebuilding project itself (Mac Ginty 2010, p. 399).
2.2. The problem of executive missions
Critiques of liberal peacebuilding are ampliﬁed in operations with executive mandates.
When international actors are empowered to pass laws, dismiss oﬃcials, or, as in the
case of EULEX, adjudicate in the most sensitive criminal proceedings, international pro-
cesses run in parallel to local ones. Some scholars see such transferrals of sovereignty
onto international actors as a temporary necessity to restore basic functions of post-
conﬂict states (Caplan 2005, Chesterman 2005), others label them an imperial exercise, dis-
missing them on principle (Chandler 2006). Looking for reasoning for why locals might
object to them, Bain (2003) argues that such operations stand in a fundamental opposition
to the right to self-determination and that consent to authority is needed for their legiti-
macy. Zaum (2007, p. 67) sees the “eﬀectiveness of government” as one of the key sources
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of their authority. Scholars disagree whether the opposition to executive missions is due to
their intrusive form (input legitimacy) or their failure to deliver (output legitimacy). While
some studies have looked at everyday resistance to such missions (Visoka 2011, Mahr
2018), most analyses still take a top-down approach coming to their ﬁndings about the
(in)appropriateness of the model without researching motivations of local actors.
Executive missions suﬀer from the lack of local ownership, as they are put in place to
temporarily replace deﬁcient local governance. An executive rule of law mission, such
as EULEX, to an extent needs to insulate its processes from local actors’ involvement if
it wants to claim it is acting as an independent judiciary. While these missions still
profess to pursue local ownership, as this aids their exit strategy (Caplan 2005), critical
scholars have argued that as they are unaccountable to the local level, the processes
and policies they put in place are performative and, by deﬁnition, cannot be locally
owned (Chandler 2006). Notwithstanding this critique, neither problem-solving scholars
nor practitioners would disagree that input legitimacy is an especially diﬃcult undertaking
for an executive mission.
Executive missions need to primarily rely on output legitimacy, when trying to secure
the support of local population (Caplan 2005, Chesterman 2004, Zaum 2007, Peter
2013). Krasner and Risse (2014, p. 557) stipulate that such output legitimacy can be
achieved in two ways, ﬁrst, through expert and moral authority of the intervener, and
second, through initial performance of the intervener meeting the expectations of local
communities. Expectations are context-speciﬁc and would depend on what locals under-
stand as success. Moral and expert authority, conversely, have been conceptualised in the
literature. Zaum (2007, pp. 62–67) contends that executive missions maintain moral auth-
ority, when they are seen to be advancing intersubjective values that local institutions are
not willing or able to deliver on. The moral authority is linked to locals agreeing with
mission priorities and deeming that the mission is implementing these. The expert auth-
ority is maintained when locals trust that an international mission possesses superior
knowledge and integrity to that of their local counterparts (Krasner and Risse 2014,
p. 557), meaning, that it is perceived as an authority (Friedman 1990).
2.3. The European Union, local ownership, and the limits of normative power
Europe
The EU makes a substantial eﬀort in integrating the language of ownership into its external
policy discourse, indicating a care about legitimacy and sustainability of its policies. The
latest EU Global Strategy lists CSDP operations as one instrument that will “blend top-
down and bottom-up eﬀorts fostering the building blocks of sustainable statehood
rooted in local agency” (EU 2016a, p. 31). Local authorities and civil societies are identiﬁed
as actors with whom the EU should work (EU 2016a, p. 31). When it comes to implemen-
tation, empirical studies consistently identify the want of input legitimacy as one of the
biggest problems for EU operations (Dursun-Ozkanca and Vandemoortele 2012, Rayroux
and Wilén 2014, Qehaja and Prezelj 2017). Ejdus (2017, p. 468) furthermore argues that
the Union experiences some speciﬁc problems when implementing local ownership as
its crisis management is “additionally hampered by the politics and policy-making of CSDP”.
Unlike the problems with local ownership (input legitimacy), addressed in more
bottom-up studies, the literature in EU studies overall conceptualises the Union as a
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particularly good actor to wield moral and expert authority, thus having preconditions for
output legitimacy. Debates describing EU as a “normative power” (Manners 2002), “cosmo-
politan power” (Sjursen 2006), and “soft power” (Michalski 2005) are underpinned by the
idea that EU inﬂuences through “the power of ideas” (Galtung 1973, p. 33). In these same
discourses, the EU possesses comparative advantages when it comes to civilian expertise.
As Merlingen (2007, p. 437) concludes, these debates espouse that “the Union diﬀuses uni-
versal values such as peace, democracy, the rule of law and human rights by virtue of its
international presence and value-rational conduct in foreign policy”.
Others have argued that, while the EU has increased its international presence, it might
be losing the value-driven external policy, if it ever had one (Merlingen 2007, Hyde-Price
2006). Youngs (2004, p. 415) contends that “instrumentalist security-oriented dynamics
persist within the parameters set by norms deﬁning the EU’s identity”. This problem has
been noted also in the literature on the Western Balkans, with Ioannides and Collantes-
Celador (2011) maintaining that CSDP missions there are increasingly guided by the
“internal-external security nexus”. Similar argument has beenmade in the literature on “sta-
bilitocracy” (Kmezić and Bieber 2017), which concludes that the EU has become content in
supporting autocratically minded leaders, who guarantee stability of the region. Our double
proximity paradox of peacebuilding builds on these literatures, reasoning that by signalling
high commitment for structural reforms, and then abandoning them in practice, local cri-
tiques even by generally constructive actors become more salient.
2.4. Analytical framework
Critiques of liberal peacebuilding, especially of executive missions, are manifold. They
could be principled, with locals objecting to an executive mission taking over sovereign
functions of their state (Chandler 2006, Visoka 2011), or, in a case of contested statehood,
to internationals supporting a state (Mahr 2018, Zupančič 2018). Locals could also be
objecting to the speciﬁc actor underwriting the mission, or to the substantive (liberal)
agenda of the mission, arguing that such norms are inappropriate for the context (Lee
2015).
But the negative perception of the mission could also arise when locals agree with the
mission’s objectives, but the mission is not delivering on these (the intention–implemen-
tation gap). Or the work of the mission could be misperceived, again resulting in negative
perceptions (the implementation–perception gap). These gaps are not surprising as such
and there will always be some discrepancy between the stated policy, its implementation,
and how local actors perceive this implementation. But when critiques are uniform and
concern the core objectives of the mission, understanding why they occur should be of
interest not just to peacebuilding scholars but also to the EU.
In our empirical analysis, we compare implementers’ and local accounts of EULEX to
elucidate how the two gaps contribute to the negative perception of the mission. Parallels
in their critiques reveal inconsistencies between the rhetoric and practice of the EU’s
approach to Kosovo and would be an indication of the intention–implementation gap.
Examples of such critiques, based on the above literature, would be lack of proper
implementation of mission priorities, template-based approach to designing the
mission, lack of sensitivity to local context, even the lack of local ownership in the
design of the mission. An agreement between EULEX and local experts ﬁrst and foremost
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captures concerns about the particularities of the implementation of the EU rule of mission
in Kosovo. However, such critiques could also point to more structural concerns, especially
when concerning the core objective of the mission and the overarching purpose of EU
peacebuilding attempts.
Diﬀerences in understandings and critiques of local and EULEX experts, on the other
hand, mean that either locals are misperceiving the work of the mission, internationals
lack self-awareness of their work, or the two groups do not have a shared understanding
of the mission’s purpose. Misperceptions and lack of self-awareness go hand in hand, indi-
cating the most obvious implementation–perception gap. Examples of such critiques would
be the lack of accountability of international staﬀ or their perceived lack of expertise or
commitment to their work. Such critiques can be serious contributors to “the bad
image” of the mission but are concerns that an underwriter could ameliorate through
public relations campaigns or training and stricter accountability procedures for staﬀ
(EU 2016b, UN 2017). However, a lack of a shared understanding of the mission’s
purpose between the implementers and local experts signals a more fundamental
concern, not just for the mission, but also for the EU’s ability to act in post-conﬂict settings.
3. The European Union and its rule of law mission in Kosovo
The United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 1244, which established the UN
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), allowed for a possibility of an executive
mandate in all aspects of civilian administration (UN 1999). While international police
oﬃcers were deployed immediately after the ceaseﬁre, the UN initially decided not to
introduce international jurists (Betts et al. 2001). A Joint Advisory Council, composed of
international and Kosovo representatives, selected local judges and prosecutors and as
no Kosovo-Serb jurist applied, the composition of the Kosovo judicial system became
entirely ethnically Albanian (Skendaj 2014, p. 89). Such a system was widely seen as
biased against Kosovo minorities, leading to the eventual deployment of international
judges and prosecutors. This bias represents a concern to this day and the integration
of Kosovo-Serb judges from the so-called parallel institutions3 is one of the four areas
EULEX is focusing on.4
The EU has played an increasingly important role in Kosovo since the 1990s, in 2003
including Kosovo in its Stabilisation and Association Process, a policy that serves as a fra-
mework for future integration for the Western Balkans states (EU 2003). One of the main
priorities in ensuring this European perspective is rule of law. Almost simultaneously as
Kosovo proclaimed its independence, in February 2008, the Council of the EU in one
Joint Action established both the EU Special Representative (EUSR) and EULEX Kosovo
(EU 2008). While EUSR was deployed quickly, the EULEX mission became operational
only in April 2009 (Grevi 2009, pp. 356–359). These two missions are still the main EU
bodies on the ground, with EUSR now also double-hatted as the Head of EU Oﬃce. The
EUSR/EU Oﬃce is the main political partner, while EULEX is designed as a technical/
legal CSDP mission, which took over executive justice functions from UNMIK. Both deal
with rule of law issues.
In addition to its substantial ground presence, the EU is involved in broader diplomatic
and economic relations with Kosovo and the region. The most notable is the EU-facilitated
dialogue for the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Priština, which is from
EUROPEAN SECURITY 7
2014 facilitated by the High Representative for Foreign Aﬀairs and Security Policy/Vice-Pre-
sident of the Commission (Bátora et al. 2018). Exploring these wider engagements is
beyond the scope of this article, but there are two features impacting the implementation
and perception of EULEX. First, Kosovo and the broader region can be considered a priority
in the EU external agenda, seen not only in the substantial ground presence and the
ﬁnancial resources committed, but also in the level of people involved in eﬀorts to
address the regional crises. Second, the CSDP mission is part of the EU’s comprehensive
approach to crises (EU 2013), making EULEX one element of how the EU is implementing
multiple objectives in the region. Besides the rule of law, an explicit objective of EULEX, the
EU is also contributing to conﬂict management through the normalisation dialogue, which
the mission is supposed to assist (EU, n.d.). Contributions to EULEX are motivated also by
concerns for European security, with the mission asked to work on organised crime and its
links to European criminal networks (EU 2012). Lastly, given its investment in EULEX, the
mission is also a testing ground for EU’s nascent foreign policy capacities.
4. Implementation and perception of EULEX by rule of law experts
Over the next section, we unpack critiques of rule of law experts in Kosovo. Drawing on
concerns identiﬁed in the existing literature and our analytical framework, we identiﬁed
six possible objections in their narratives: principled resistance; lack of local ownership;
CSDP particularities; corruption and lack of accountability; de-prioritisation of the main
objective; and unmet expectations.
4.1. Principled resistance to executive powers
Existing scholarship of local contestation in Kosovo (Visoka 2011, Radin 2014, Mahr
2018, Zupančič 2018) has emphasised the importance of principled resistance to
EULEX, both among Kosovo-Albanian and Kosovo-Serb population. Kosovo-Albanians
are seen to be resisting EULEX as an unaccountable entity trying to replace local insti-
tutions, while Kosovo-Serbs see EULEX – despite its status-neutral stance – working with
the local judiciary, thus supporting Kosovo-Albanian institutions, which the minority
population does not recognise. Our local interlocutors recognised these narratives,
but did not see them as central to their critique. Every expert, both majority and min-
ority, acknowledged the magnitude of problems with the local judiciary and saw some
value in EULEX, including its executive functions. This comports with Subotic’s (2011,
p. 310) argument that candidate states who identify strongly with the EU are more
willing to accept its intrusive policies.
Our minority interviewees argued that there was a bias in EULEX’s mandate, and that
this made the support of Kosovo-Serbs diﬃcult. But they did not see contestation as
immutable, as all locals end up judging the mission on its results. One argued that initially
“the minority people had no trust in EULEX, however, today, they would rather give the
case to EULEX than the local judiciary”.5 This experience was intimated to us also by
EULEX staﬀ in Mitrovica, an area where most Kosovo-Serbs live. They recognised some
principled resistance, for example, Kosovo-Serbs often refused to accept EULEX correspon-
dence as it bore Kosovo postal stamps.6 But they also argued that resistance was more a
question of political elites or even Belgrade, and that “normal people” and civil society
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were more practical. As parallel institutions could not handle criminal cases, Kosovo-Serbs
turned to EULEX for justice. EU courts in Mitrovica, were therefore also dealing with dom-
estic violence cases.7
Our Kosovo-Albanian interlocutors intimated even less principled resistance against an
executive mission, with local judges broadly agreeing that external help was needed to
ameliorate political pressures on the local judiciary. One saw international judges as indis-
pensable in securing trust and integration of minority groups. She held that Kosovo-Serbs
and Kosovo-Bosnians had more trust in international judges, which ensured these min-
orities were seeking formal justice.8 Her colleague argued that in war crimes cases, the
situation would have been untenable for local judges, who live among the people.9
EULEX staﬀ thought that local judges were aware that an executive mandate was
needed to protect them from political pressures in cases involving war crimes and high-
level corruption. One EULEX judge spoke of a particularly sensitive case she worked on
by concluding, “the media reporting was constant and we felt it. I can only imagine
how diﬃcult it would have been for a local judge”.10 Kosovo-Albanian civil society repre-
sentatives corroborated this atmosphere, seeing some value to EULEX, with statements of
outright opposition to its executive mandate directly linked to results, indicating that
something else but a principled opposition to the mission was at play. One argued, “we
had high expectations and it proved to be a big disappointment”.11 As a result, this inter-
viewee was now against EULEX’s executive mandate. Another provided more nuance by
claiming that an executive mission, which does not deliver, is even worse than no execu-
tive mission at all: “the whole set-up is the problem – it is creating a disconnect between
politicians and voters – there is an additional layer of governance which is the inter-
national community. The politicians are not held accountable”.12
While several of our interviewees intimated that they wanted EULEX and its executive
functions gone, their objection were not outright rejections of missions with executive
powers or EU presence. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that our interviewees were local
rule of law experts, the idea of EULEX itself was not communicated to us as highly
problematic.
4.2. Lack of local ownership
One of the biggest problems any executive mission faces is lack of local ownership, as key
decisions are deliberately taken out of hands of local actors. Critiques of deﬁciencies in
input legitimacy were therefore expected, if anything, based on the existing literature
on local resistance in Kosovo (Visoka 2011, Mahr 2018) and broader peacebuilding scholar-
ship, we expected them to be harsher.
Some civil society representatives held that sincere consultations happen only with
elites, which the EU is supposed to hold accountable. While the EU and EULEX have put
in place consultation mechanisms, these were not deemed genuine. One of the majority
representatives argued that “there is a structured platform for dialogue with civil society /
… / but there is no room for criticising the EU”.13 The lack of consultation was a particularly
acute problem for minority representatives, who saw the mission and the EU focusing on
high-level input, including from Belgrade, at the expense of truly local consultations.
According to one Kosovo-Serb, “the local institutions are reporting to EULEX but communi-
cation only goes in one direction”.14 Another minority representative mentioned the
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curtailed daily contact of Kosovo-Serbs with EULEX staﬀ, which makes the mission less
attuned to the concerns of the minority population: “EULEX people don’t go around in
the North unless they have high protection.”15
Others argued that for being an executive mission, EULEX’s track record in consulting locals
could have been worse.16 One Kosovo-Albanian summarised: “We see the EU here on the
ground as very active. /… / We are asked to give general views on diﬀerent themes and
topics and are invited to those where we have expertise.”17 Local judges similarly intimated
a good working relationship with their EULEX counterparts, seeing variation more as a
matter of personalities: “some really listen to local interpretations, others are more dismis-
sive”.18 Another argued that what helped was that most EU judges came from legal systems
that had similarities with Kosovo’s. This gave them advantage over UNMIK ones, who were
more clearly seen as imposing their working methods.19 When it came to more systemic
consultations, local judges saw these happening through the Kosovo Judicial Council.
They were sometimes invited to give opinion on the more political decisions, but overall
felt it was appropriate for the mission to primarily deal with formal structures.
EULEX staﬀ were cognisant that the mission did not have the best consultation mech-
anisms. For most part, EU judges and prosecutors argued that they needed to be insulated
from the local population to maintain their independence, adding that the mission leader-
ship should have instituted better consultations.20 They saw their contribution to local
ownership in their interactions with local judges and prosecutors. Several criticised the
mission for starkly separating its executive and capacity-building work in its 2012
review, arguing that even EULEX implementers were not consulted on this decision.21
One concluded, “in the beginning it was hard to gain trust from local judges, and then
that trust gets lost as the mandate won’t allow mentoring anymore”.22 In Mitrovica,
where the local and EULEX judiciary were entirely separated and with no mixed panels,
EULEX and local judges started informally organising jurisprudence meetings. One EU
judge saying, “the attendance is not great, but we are trying, as it is important for us to
be seen as partners”.23
Both EULEX and local experts agreed that local ownership is an in-built problem for
executive missions, concluding that even with the best intentions, there will inevitably
be an intention–implementation gap, as the implementer tries to claim it is pursuing
locally owned processes, but the design of the mission will not allow for these. An execu-
tive mission would heighten, not cause, problems with implementing rule of law priori-
ties. However, local and EULEX judges and prosecutors did see the EU harming its
implementation eﬀorts by trying to completely insulate the executive component of
the mission from the strengthening one. One EULEX prosecutor concluded that given
the little interaction between the strengthening and the executive side of EULEX,
even informal feedback from local counterparts, does not reach people who oversee
local ownership policies.24
4.3. CSDP staﬃng, turnover, and the lack of expert authority
Both our local and international experts were stunned about the one-size-ﬁts-all approach
the EU adopted in setting up the mission and almost every interviewee mentioned the
problem with high turnover of EULEX staﬀ. These were perceived as parachuting in, not
knowing the system or Kosovo.25 A local judge argued that the system inﬂuenced the
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quality of EU judges wanting to serve and the perception of their rulings by the Kosovo-
Albanians. Many came from Eastern Europe (Poland and Bulgaria topped the list) and
locals, sometimes justiﬁably, criticised their decisions due to the strong stereotypes
about these countries.26 His colleague agreed, adding that through the years she saw
some great EU oﬃcers, but there were also quite a few who were “clearly not top
experts in their own countries”.27 While not expecting judges with experience of war
crime cases, she was surprised that some had background in civil not criminal law.
EULEX was seen as increasingly lacking expert authority, with one EU judge commenting,
“our local colleagues are well educated, they see this”.28
EULEX implementers overall agreed with the analysis of local experts attributing pro-
blems to internal EU considerations. There was an overwhelming consensus that in
mission planning, the EU was focused on what worked best for the EU, not what was
most appropriate for Kosovo. EULEX was staﬀed in the same manner as other CSDP mis-
sions: oﬃcials were either seconded by member states or contracted by the mission itself.
Such a system was deemed incompatible with the tasks the EU was taking on, “in legal
proceedings, you cannot change an investigator every year”.29 This turnover particularly
impacted the seconded staﬀ, where the decision on the length of their mandate rested
with the sending state. At the time of interviews, roughly three quarters of staﬀ
working in the Executive Division were seconded.30 In contrast, contracted staﬀ were
hired on short, but renewable, contracts and were therefore seen to be under bigger
pressure to perform to the wishes of the management.
One EULEX interlocutor maintained that the mission preferred seconded staﬀ (as these
were paid by the sending states) so it repeatedly appointed to managerial posts people
who lacked the required experience. Member states were happy to appoint their own
to key positions.31 Her colleague maintained that the EU should have treated the executive
wing of EULEX as an international court. When it came to judges, their position needed to
be secure and for a longer period, otherwise it becomes diﬃcult to maintain you are
running an independent judiciary.32
Unlike with the local ownership question, neither local nor EULEX experts saw staﬃng
as an inherent problem for executive missions. They were therefore less sympathetic of
the EU implementing its own IKEA/CSDP template, arguing that this intention–implemen-
tation gapwas almost entirely of its own making. They saw staﬃng as contributing to the
problems with normative commitments of the EU as it undermined expert authority of
the mission.
4.4. Corruption, lack of accountability and moral authority
Almost every civil society representative we spoke to, mentioned corruption within EULEX
at some point, with corrupt EULEX seen as enabling corrupt local elites. According to one
Kosovo-Albanian, the general perception is that EULEX is not doing anything about the
main problem in Kosovo: “there is a lot of political interference and no MPs in prison”.
This interviewee linked the lack of action on local corruption with corruption within
EULEX: “78% think that rule of law institutions – locals and EULEX – are inﬂuenced by poli-
ticians according to a recent poll. We are losing faith in the EU.”33 Another majority repre-
sentative was even more explicit, stating “they [EULEX] cannot ﬁght corruption because
they are so involved in corruption themselves”.34 Others argued that the mere presence
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of EULEX allowed for political interference in local judiciary to persist. As the blame-game
continued, the local judiciary could hide behind the mistakes of the international
mission.35
In contrast to civil society narratives, every interviewee with direct experience with
EULEX, including internationals not employed by the mission and local judges and staﬀ,
rejected EULEX suﬀering from systemic corruption. However, they agreed that the per-
ceived corruption was a major concern and that Brussels and EULEX management
should have acted swiftly when allegations started. While a preliminary investigation by
the EULEX mission found no evidence of corruption among EULEX staﬀ, and the Jacque
independent report (EU 2015) echoed this, rumours of corruption had been ﬂourishing
for a long time before the Union acted (Capussela 2015). Jacque criticised the EU for
not opening an investigation into the allegations immediately as “[t]his would have pre-
vented the issues that later arose in connection with the use of secret and special pro-
cedures, which fuelled suspicions of a cover-up” (EU 2015, p. 8).
Regardless of whether the implementation–perception gap was due to misperception or
the lack of self-awareness among EU staﬀ, there was a broad agreement that action was
needed. If EU ﬁndings and EULEX narratives were correct and this truly was a mispercep-
tion, responding to suspicions of political interference and corruption would have been
crucial for any international mission, even more so for one with an executive mandate
to ﬁght corruption itself. The ability to claim moral authority in its work is lost otherwise.
4.5. De-prioritisation of rule of law
Local and EULEX experts agreed that despite rule of law being the EU’s lauded priority for
Kosovo (EU 2008), in practice, this objective was being sacriﬁced for immediate security
concerns of the EU, which included conﬂict management between Kosovo and Serbia.
As these objectives required an elite buy-in, accountability of these same elites was
seen to be lost along the way. One EULEX oﬃcial commented that Brussels spends an
immense amount of energy on the normalisation process, often at the expense of “the
real problems” with the Kosovo judiciary.36
Our research supports previous ﬁndings on the decline of EU’s value-driven policy in
the region, with several local experts using the language of “stabilocracy” or “stabilitoc-
racy” (Kmezić and Bieber 2017). A majority representative encapsulated this:
the EU came to strengthen the rule of law here but did the opposite. The purpose was to make
the local judges competent enough for EULEX to leave – but today it is worse than it was in
2008. EU is more interested in stability with Serbia than with what is going on within the
country.37
Another saw the main challenge to the sector being in “a political class which has been
installed for the sake of stability. /… / But these political leaders have embedded the struc-
tures of corruption and organised crime – the underground is becoming part of the main-
stream politics”.38 The EU was seen to be needing these leaders for greater purposes with
no interest in holding them accountable.
This sentiment resonated with what EULEX staﬀ told us about how they sensed that the
EU maintained a balance between various strong groups needed for broader political
agendas. Many listed subtle forms of pressure:39 prosecutors were let known informally
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that a certain person should or should not be indicted; EULEX Head of Judges reassigned a
sensitive case from a certain judge; interim court measures were not implemented by
EULEX police; content of press statements was changed somewhere above; issues
raised about handling of a case never received a reply, etc. These examples illustrate
the atmosphere among staﬀ and one EULEX employee argued that she constantly feels
like there are other things at work. She continued that when things are a bit out of the
ordinary, staﬀ are never told why they happen the way they do and that this is not
how an independent judiciary is supposed to function. She spoke of a constant consider-
ation of other EU objectives by the management, resulting in the mandate of the mission
not being implemented properly.
Other examples related to cases EULEX was prioritising. While the European Court of
Auditors (EU 2012) concluded that given the international nature of organised crime, EU
security objectives had not been adequately integrated into the mission, our interlocutors
oﬀered diﬀerent opinions. One of them argued that the biggest impact coming out of
EULEX deployment was the international police cooperation. He continued that through
EU presence on the ground, EULEX investigators were helping build cases in their home
countries and that more had been done on this than on the organised crime in Kosovo.40
The political considerations in their legal mandate were a source of constant frustration
to EULEX staﬀ and some openly stated that despite its heavy footprint, the EU was not
serious about rule of law in Kosovo. This lack of normative commitment was recognised
as the core problem for the mission also by our local interlocutors. Such broad agreement
on a core priority of the mission being sacriﬁced, reveals that locals are not misperceiving
the work of the mission and that there is indeed a great disconnect between rhetoric and
practice of the EU, the intention–implementation gap. This gap points to a core problem in
the EU maintaining its normative commitments when trying to pursue other, more
immediate, priorities – our ﬁrst paradox of peacebuilding.
4.6. The purpose of EULEX and raised expectations
One of the most consequential divergences between local experts and EULEX implemen-
ters was in their understanding of the mission’s purpose. While all of them supported rule
of law and eﬀorts to address endemic corruption, our follow-up queries revealed that the
devil was in the detail. Only more detailed questions about concrete frustrations and
expectations of EULEX highlighted the disconnect.
Speaking to EULEX executive staﬀ on their expectations and what they would consider
a successful mission, they spoke of “working on diﬃcult cases”,41 “providing independent
justice”,42 and “leading by example”.43 They were not naïve, but EULEX staﬀ clearly priori-
tised processes and standards, complaining about how badly local judicial decisions were
sometimes reasoned.44 They were there to implement a technical mandate and did not
have high expectations of their contributions to ﬁghting corruption. In contrast, a local
judge grumbled about the length of time it took EULEX judges to resolve a case, saying
an EU judge handles less than two cases, while he needs to ﬁnish six or so in a year.45
His colleague agreed, arguing that international judges write their judgements in more
detail, caring too much about their quality. Given the low number of judges in the
Kosovo system, local justices were not aﬀorded such a luxury as they needed to
provide justice within a reasonable time.46 This slow handling of justice was particularly
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palpable during the hand-over period and one EULEX oﬃcial shared that the core of his
work represented handing over more than 5000 cases they had been working on to
local authorities. Around 1200 cases were inherited from UNMIK and many were still on
EULEX’s docket ten years later.47
With already diﬀering expectations about what rule of law means between local and
international judges, the civil society’s divergence from EULEX narratives was to be
expected. Our civil society interlocutors generally expressed that the EU did not deliver
on what it had promised in 2008. One Kosovo-Albanian summed up, “we had high expec-
tations and it proved to be a big disappointment”.48 Another explained that people
expected EULEX to “go after the big ﬁsh” but that “this expectation had not been
met”.49 He saw the challenge arising from EULEX being asked for results early on to
show its eﬀectiveness and therefore the “low hanging fruits” were picked, such as drug
cases, which would not have been hard for the local judiciary to address. A minority repre-
sentative added, “when you see the cost of the EULEX mission, you would expect more
results”.50 This discrepancy on what would constitute success for EULEX did not escape
many of our EU interlocutors. One EULEX judge argued that there were cases, where
“everyone in Priština knew that the guy was guilty”, but the case was not a solid one
and the person was therefore acquitted. Given the high-proﬁle of the case, she knew
that locals did not see this as fair or ﬁghting corruption.51 Her colleague added, “for us
success is justice, for Brussels and locals it means convictions”.52
This mention of Brussels having a diﬀerent expectation of what would be success for
EULEX than the mission staﬀ, was intimated to us on several occasions, with both locals
and EULEX staﬀ agreeing that, when the mission was launched, the EU communicated
high political ambitions for what EULEX was there to achieve. This expectation was
fuelled through value-driven rhetoric, unprecedented investment, and the many high-
proﬁle visits. A technical mission, even if everything was implemented perfectly, was
never going to be able to meet this ambition. While the diﬀerent narratives of success
between local and EULEX experts indicate an implementation–perception gap, they also
point to what we refer to as the second paradox of peacebuilding, which goes beyond
the practical implementation of this individual mission. It is a problem of trying to
achieve political goals through a technical mission, with the failure to achieve such politi-
cal goals more visible in a mission, where the intervening actor has raised expectations of
success. In such missions, even concrete achievements that fall short of what was commu-
nicated can be perceived as failures.
5. Conclusions
An executive rule of law mission in Kosovo was an exceptional undertaking for the Union.
An unprecedented commitment from the EU and high approvals for the Union in Kosovo,
meant that the mission had pre-conditions to succeed. Since then, EULEX has been criti-
cised in scholarship, EU reports, local media, and perception studies. Even EULEX staﬀ we
interviewed struggled to ﬁnd successes. To gain deeper insights on its lessons, we turned
to rule of law experts.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given their backgrounds and relationship with the EU, Kosovo
rule of law experts provided nuanced but somewhat tempered critiques of EULEX. The
substantial overlap in their critiques with those of EULEX staﬀ, highlighted that most
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concerns related to how the mission was implemented, not misperceptions of its work.
The clearest implementation–perception gap concerned corruption allegations; an issue
our interlocutors agreed the EU could have ameliorated with prompt action. For the EU,
EULEX highlights the need for improved accountability procedures.
Conversely, while our experts were sympathetic to some of the problems arising out of
the intention–implementation gap – most notably, concerns about the lack of local owner-
ship –, they showed less sympathy for what they saw as EU speciﬁc problems. Although
the EU was in many ways seen as the most appropriate partner, not just because of
Kosovo’s membership ambitions but also due to a substantial overlap between the
legal systems of Kosovo and EU member states, in other ways the problems were seen
to be caused by EU as an actor and were related to what we refer to as the double proxi-
mity paradox in peacebuilding.
The ﬁrst of these EU speciﬁc problems was related to CSDP staﬃng, which resulted in
EULEX losing its expert authority. While willing to deploy a heavy-footprint mission due
to its deeper interests in the region, the EU ended up prioritising its internal processes
over the needs of Kosovo, with the heavy-footprint highlighting its failure to deploy the
most appropriate people. This “design ﬂaw” aﬀects an executive mission more than a
capacity-building one, but still holds lessons for the EU, who, if it wishes to retain its
peacebuilding ambitions, cannot aﬀord to lose credibility among local experts. None-
theless, staﬃng, while a complex matter, could be addressed through reforms within
the EU/CSDP.
The second – and deeper – problem was the perceived de-prioritisation of rule of law in
the EU approach towards the region, which saw Brussels/EULEX management intervening
in the work of EULEX judiciary, compromising its independence and moral authority. The
sacriﬁcing of normative ambitions for stability concerns has been well explored previously
and aﬀects an executive mission more than a capacity-building one. The double proximity
paradox is clear; on the one hand, the EU was willing to commit substantial resources to
address Kosovo’s issues with rule of law due to their centrality for EU security, on the other,
the EU’s immediate security concerns rest on cooperation of political elites, which the
mission is supposed to hold accountable. The de-prioritisation of rule of law combined
with the high visibility of the mission made its problems more obvious.
The critiques of EULEX hold another lesson for the EU and for broader peacebuilding
endeavours, one about the importance of shared expectations between implementers
and locals. This is a fundamental problem of peacebuilding exercises, which are designed
as technical missions but imbued with all sorts of political aspirations. This aﬀects percep-
tion of executive missions particularly as their failure to deliver is concrete. Again, the
double proximity paradox is sharp; as Western Balkans is central to EU’s external policy,
Kosovo received high-level attention from Brussels committing EULEX to tackling
endemic corruption. This raised local expectations, making the eventual failure to meet
these political promises through a technical mission more palpable.
While EULEX was a unique mission, which the EU is unlikely to repeat in the immediate
future, we nonetheless conclude that its lessons are applicable more broadly. We further-
more maintain that the double proximity paradox is central to understanding why mis-
sions where an intervening actor has invested enormously are often perceived more
negatively even among the experts.
EUROPEAN SECURITY 15
Notes
1. Police and customs reform have been viewedmore favourably in the literature and among the
local population (Keukeleire and Thiers 2010).
2. Interviews are anonymised following ethical guidelines of the EUNPACK project and are refer-
enced stating the name of the interviewer and the code of the interviewee.
3. Parallel structures are institutions in Kosovo not mandated by the UN Security Council resol-
ution 1244. Such institutions have been operating under de facto authority of the Serbian gov-
ernment (Baylis 2007).
4. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 1, 3 and 6, 23 and 24 October 2017. Also, EU (n.d.).
5. Osland and Peter, local actor 10, 26 October 2017.
6. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 9, 27 October 2017.
7. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 7 and 8, 27 October 2017.
8. Peter, local judge 1, 25 October 2017.
9. Peter, local judge 2, 25 October 2017.
10. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 5, 24 October 2017.
11. Osland, local actor 6, 28 November 2017.
12. Osland, local actor 1, 23 October 2017
13. Osland, local actor 1.
14. Osland and Peter, local actor 11, 26 October 2017.
15. Osland and Peter, local actor 10.
16. Osland, local actors 7 and 6, 25 October and 28 November 2017
17. Osland, local actor 5, 24 October 2017.
18. Peter, local judge 1.
19. Peter, local judge 2.
20. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 4 and 8, 24 and 27 October 2017.
21. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 6, 24 October 2017.
22. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 7.
23. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 8, 27 October 2017.
24. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 6.
25. Osland and Peter, local actor 9, 26 October 2017
26. Peter, local judge 2.
27. Peter, local judge 1.
28. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 4, 24 October 2017.
29. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 10, 27 October 2017.
30. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 1, 23 October 2017.
31. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 6.
32. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 4.
33. Osland, local actor 5.
34. Osland, local actor 6.
35. Osland, local actors 1 and 7.
36. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 6.
37. Osland, local actor 8, 25 October 2017.
38. Osland, local actor 1.
39. To completely protect the anonymity of interviewees on this sensitive issue, no reference to
speciﬁc interviews is made in this paragraph. This is something that was promised to the inter-
locutors explicitly (Peter). For further information, please consult EUNPACK Ethical Guidelines.
40. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 2, 23 October 2017.
41. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 4.
42. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 9.
43. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 6.
44. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 4 and 6.
45. Peter, local judge 2.
46. Peter, local judge 1.
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47. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 1.
48. Osland, local actor 6.
49. Osland, local actor 7.
50. Osland and Peter, local actor 9.
51. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 5.
52. Peter, EULEX staﬀ 6.
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